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ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION V. CHILDRESS: EXCESSIVE
FOCUS ON MITIGATING FACTORS IN ATTORNEY
MISCONDUCT CASE FAILS TO PRESERVE PUBLIC
CONFIDENCE IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION
In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Childress (Childress I]),' the
Court of Appeals of Maryland held that James F. Childress, a practic-
ing attorney in Maryland and the District of Columbia, violated Vir-
ginia Code section 18.2-370 (A) (4) by entering chat rooms on America
Online, engaging in sexual conversations with teenage girls, and then
meeting with those girls on several occasions. 2 Having found that
Childress violated section 18.2-370(A) (4), the court further held that
Childress violated Maryland Rule of Professional Conduct (MRPC)
8.4(d).3 The court suspended Childress from practicing law indefi-
nitely, but granted him the right to apply to terminate the suspension
after one year.4 The court recognized the social dangers of adults
preying on children through Internet use and the effect Childress's
misconduct had on the public's perception of the legal profession.5
However, the court reasoned that various factors, including Chil-
dress's acknowledgement of his misconduct, expression of remorse,
and successful participation in a treatment program, mitigated the
sanction.6 By placing extensive weight on these mitigating factors and
the factual differences between this case and others involving attorney
sexual misconduct with children, the court failed to protect the public
and preserve public confidence in the legal profession.
1. 364 Md. 48, 770 A.2d 685 (2001).
2. Id. at 64, 770 A.2d at 694; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-370 (Michie Supp. 2001).
Section 18.2-370(A)(4) states:
A. Any person eighteen years of age or over, who, with lascivious intent, shall
knowingly and intentionally commit any of the following acts with any child
under the age of fourteen years shall be guilty of a Class 5 felony:
(4) Propose to such child the performance of an act of sexual intercourse or
any act constituting an offense under § 18.2-361 ....
Id.
3. Childress II, 364 Md. at 64, 770 A.2d at 694. MRPC 8.4(d) states: "It is professional
misconduct for a lawyer to . . . (d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administra-
tion ofjustice .... " MD. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(d) (2002).
4. Childress II, 364 Md. at 67, 770 A.2d at 696.
5. Id. at 65, 770 A.2d at 695.
6. Id. at 65-66, 770 A.2d at 695-96.
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I. THE CASE
On May 11, 1995, a federal grand jury in the District of Maryland
indicted James F. Childress, a practicing attorney in Maryland and the
District of Columbia, and charged him with violating 18 U.S.C.
§ 2423(b), which forbids traveling in interstate commerce for the pur-
pose of engaging in a sexual act with a minor.' The charges stemmed
from Childress's conduct during the years 1993 to 1995.8 During this
time, Childress used his home computer to enter "chat rooms" on
America Online and converse with girls between the ages of thirteen
and sixteen.' On occasion, Childress asked the girls whether they
were interested in meeting and having sex. 10 He persuaded five girls
to meet with him.'" Childress also encouraged the girls to keep the
conversations and meetings secret from their parents. 12 According to
Childress and the girls who met him, however, no sexual contact ever
took place, and the conversations during these encounters were not of
a sexual nature.
13
On April 12, 1995, Childress entered an online chat room and
arranged a meeting at the Montgomery Mall in Bethesda, Maryland,
with a person he believed to be a fourteen-year-old girl.14 In fact,
Childress had arranged a meeting with a FBI special agent.15 On
April 14, 1995, Childress traveled from his home in Arlington, Vir-
ginia to the Montgomery Mall.' 6 At the mall he was arrested.'" Fol-
lowing ajury trial in the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, Childress was convicted and sentenced to "five months of
incarceration, five months home detention, a $5,000 fine, a period of
supervised release, and a special assessment of $50."l' As a result of
7. United States v. Childress, 104 F.3d 47, 49 (4th Cir. 1996); see also 18 U.S.C.
§ 2423(b) (1994) (amended 1995).
8. Att'y Griev. Comm'n v. Childress, 360 Md. 373, 377, 758 A.2d 117, 119 (2000). For




12. Id. at 383, 758 A.2d at 122.
13. Id. at 377, 758 A.2d at 119.
14. Id. at 377-78, 758 A.2d at 119.
15. Id. at 378, 758 A.2d at 119.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. United States v. Childress, 104 F.3d 47, 48 (4th Cir. 1996).
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his conviction, Childress was suspended from the practice of law in
the District of Columbia. 9
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, Childress argued that his conduct was not a crime under
18 U.S.C. § 2423(b), and that the District Court improperly corrected
what it determined to be a congressional drafting error in the stat-
ute. 2' The Fourth Circuit agreed and held that the District Court
erred in treating a cross reference in § 2423(b) as a mistake. 21 Thus,
as a result of the language of the statute at the time Childress engaged
in the misconduct, the Fourth Circuit determined that a criminal con-
viction was not warranted.22
The Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland then filed a pe-
tition for disciplinary action in the Court of Appeals of Maryland, al-
leging that Childress violated Rule 8.4(d).28 In accordance with
Maryland Rule 16-709(b),24 the Court of Appeals referred the case to
the Circuit Court for Prince George's County.25 After an evidentiary
hearing, Judge Johnson found that Childress violated 18 U.S.C.
§ 2423(b) by clear and convincing evidence, notwithstanding the re-
versal of his criminal conviction by the Fourth Circuit. 26 As a result,
Judge Johnson concluded that Childress had also violated MRPC
8.4(d).27
19. Childress I, 360 Md. at 376, 758 A.2d at 118. The District of Columbia Court of
Appeals subsequently reinstated Childress as a member of the District of Columbia Bar on
January 30, 1997. Id. at 377, 758 A.2d at 119.
20. Childress, 104 F.3d at 49. At the time of Childress's conviction, § 2423(b) defined a
"sexual act" through a cross-reference to 18 U.S.C. § 2245. 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) (1994)
(amended 1995). Section 2245, however, did not define the term "sexual act." Id. § 2245.
Rather, § 2245 stated that "[a] person who, in the course of an offense under [chapter
109A], engages in conduct that results in the death of a person, shall be punished by death
or imprisoned for any term of years or for life." Id.
21. Childress, 104 F.3d at 53.
22. Id.
23. Childress I, 360 Md. at 375, 758 A.2d at 117.
24. Maryland Rule 16-709(b) states:
Charges against an attorney shall be filed on behalf of the Commission in the
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals by order may direct that the charges be
transmitted to and heard in any court and shall designate the judge or judges to
hear the charges and the clerk responsible for maintaining the record in the
proceeding.
MD. RULE 16-709(b) (2002).
25. Childress I, 360 Md. at 375, 758 A.2d at 118.
26. Id. at 381, 758 A.2d at 121.
27. Id. at 381-82, 758 A.2d at 121 (finding "Childress's behavior.., prejudicial to the
administration of justice" and thus "likely to impair public confidence in the legal
profession").
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Childress filed two exceptions to Judge Johnson's findings with
the Court of Appeals of Maryland. The most significant was an excep-
tion to the conclusion that he violated MRPC 8.4(d). 21 Childress first
reasserted his claim that his conduct did not violate 18 U.S.C.
§ 2423(b) .29 Second, Childress argued that his conduct was not preju-
dicial to the administration ofjustice under MRPC 8.4(d) because the
conduct was purely private and unrelated to the practice of law.3" The
Court of Appeals first held that the clear determination by the Fourth
Circuit that Childress's conduct did not constitute a crime under fed-
eral law should have precluded the hearing judge from concluding
otherwise." At the same time, however, the Court of Appeals noted
that this determination did not end the inquiry. 2 Childress's conduct
could, in fact, have constituted a crime under applicable Maryland or
Virginia state law.3" Thus, an ultimate determination of whether Chil-
dress's conduct was prejudicial to the administration of justice under
MRPC 8.4(d) was premature.3 4 The court specifically emphasized
that an attorney is subject to disciplinary action for conduct outside
his or her professional role as an attorney, and that "a criminal convic-
tion is not a condition precedent for finding a violation of Rule
8.4(d)."" Leaving the question of a disciplinary sanction open, the
Court of Appeals remanded the case back to Judge Johnson for fur-
ther inquiry into whether Childress's conduct was criminal under state
law.36
Subsequent to the second evidentiary hearing, Judge Johnson
found that Childress's conduct violated both section 3-831 of the
Maryland Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article and Virginia Code
28. Id. at 379, 758 A.2d at 120. Childress also excepted to Judge Johnson's finding that
he had engaged in sexually graphic conversation with more than one young girl. Id. In
particular, Childress argued that he only had a sexually graphic conversation with one
female minor, and that the only other sexually graphic conversation he had was with the
FBI special agent, who was not a young girl. Id. The court dismissed this exception be-
cause it believed Judge Johnson was referring to conversations with "females [Childress]
believed to be minors." Id. at 380, 758 A.2d at 120.
29. Id. at 382, 758 A.2d at 121.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 386, 758 A.2d at 123.
33. Id. at 386-87, 758 A.2d at 123-24.
34. Id. at 387, 758 A.2d at 124.
35. Id. at 384-85, 758 A.2d at 123. The court specifically noted that it "need not address
the margins of Rule 8.4(d) and whether a lawyer's non-criminal, purely private conduct
might be a basis for discipline under the Rule" because Childress's misconduct was "argua-
bly criminal" and the harm or potential harm was "patent." Id. at 385-86, 758 A.2d at 123.
36. Id. at 387, 758 A.2d at 124.
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section 18.2-370(A) (4).37 As a result of these violations, Judge John-
son once again reached the conclusion that Childress's conduct vio-
lated MRPC 8.4(d). 3 Childress filed exceptions to Judge Johnson's
findings that he had violated either state statute and, as he did in his
appeal in Childress I, to Judge Johnson's conclusion that he violated
MRPC 8.4(d). 9 The Court of Appeals then heard the case for the
second time to review Childress's exceptions to Judge Johnson's find-
ings and, if allowing the disciplinary charge to stand, to determine the
appropriate sanction.4 °
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The primary goal of attorney disciplinary proceedings is to pro-
tect the public, not to punish the offending attorney.4" Maryland has
adopted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct promulgated by the
American Bar Association (ABA) as the governing standard for profes-
sional conduct.4 2 These rules, however, create only a basic regulatory
framework, which fails to provide specific instruction on appropriate
sanctions to further the goal of protecting the public.4" In Maryland,
the decision to sanction an attorney-and the type of sanction to im-
pose-ultimately rests with the highest court of the state.4 4 In deter-
mining the appropriate sanction for a violation of Rule 8.4," the
Court of Appeals of Maryland generally focuses on such factors as the
nature of harm caused by the misconduct, the relationship of the mis-
conduct to the practice of law, and whether there are any mitigating
circumstances. The approach of the Court of Appeals in cases involv-
ing sexual misconduct, particularly sexual misconduct involving chil-
dren, highlights the court's increasing emphasis on mitigating factors.
37. Childress II, 364 Md. at 52, 770 A.2d at 687-88.
38. Id., 770 A.2d at 688.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See, e.g., Att'y Griev. Comm'n v. Owrutsky, 322 Md. 334, 355, 587 A.2d 511, 521
(1991).
42. The Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct, 13 Md. Reg. 3 (May 23, 1986).
43. See, e.g., MD. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4 (2002). Although Rule 8.4 states that
it is professional misconduct for an attorney to engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice, the rule is silent on the appropriate sanction for such miscon-
duct. Id.
44. See Att'y Griev. Comm'n v. Kent, 337 Md. 361, 371, 653 A.2d 909, 914 (1995) (no-
ting that "this Court has original and complete jurisdiction over disciplinary proceedings").
45. Rule 8.4 covers a wide range of misconduct that may or may not be a direct viola-
tion of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct, but nonetheless reflects adversely on
an attorney's fitness to practice law. MD. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4.
486 [VOL. 61:482
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A. The Purpose of Attorney Disciplinary Proceedings and Factors
Considered by the Court of Appeals of Maryland
The Court of Appeals of Maryland has consistently stated that the
purpose of attorney disciplinary proceedings is to protect the public
rather than to punish the misbehaving attorney.4 6 The Court of Ap-
peals has also stated that general and specific deterrence is consistent
with the overall objective of protecting the public.4 7 The determina-
tion of an appropriate sanction to further these two goals depends on
the facts of each case.4 8 Ultimately, in cases involving Rule 8.4 viola-
tions, the court imposes a sanction after weighing all factors present
in a particular case.4 9 Generally, the court has focused its attention on
three overlapping factors: the nature of the harm caused by the attor-
ney's misconduct, the relation of the misconduct to the practice of
law, and whether any factors mitigate the harm caused by the
misconduct.
Prior to January 1, 1987, the nature of the harm caused by an
attorney's misconduct was of significant importance in attorney disci-
plinary cases.5 ° Prior to this date, the Maryland Code of Professional
Responsibility (MCPR) governed professional misconduct in Mary-
land.5" Included in the MCPR was Disciplinary Rule (DR) 1-102, the
precursor to Rule 8.4. Disciplinary Rule 1-102 (A) (3) stated that "[a]
lawyer shall not... [e]ngage in illegal conduct involving moral turpi-
tude."5 2 In Fellner v. Bar Ass'n of Baltimore City,5 3 the court focused on
the nature of the harm caused by the attorney's misconduct in decid-
ing to disbar an attorney for placing slugs in parking meters.5 4 The
court determined that the act of stealing funds from the city was "mor-
ally... as great as though he had stolen money deposited by others in
46. Owrutsky, 322 Md. at 355, 587 A.2d at 521; see also Att'y Griev. Comm'n v. Gilbert,
356 Md. 249, 254, 739 A.2d 1, 4 (1999) (noting that a sanction for an attorney convicted of
possessing crack cocaine was required "for the protection of the public").
47. Owrutsky, 322 Md. at 355, 587 A.2d at 521.
48. Gilbert, 356 Md. at 255, 739 A.2d at 4.
49. Att'y Griev. Comm'n v. Goldsborough, 330 Md. 342, 365, 624 A.2d 503, 514 (1993).
50. See Md. State Bar Ass'n v. Agnew, 271 Md. 543, 550-51, 318 A.2d 811, 815 (1974)
("A willful and serious malefaction committed by a lawyer-public servant brings dishonor to
both the bar and the democratic institutions of our nation, and its destructive effect is
thereby magnified.").
51. The Code of Professional Responsibility was replaced by the Maryland Rules of
Professional Conduct in 1987. The Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct, 13 Md. Reg. 3
(May 23, 1986).
52. MD. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIILITy DR 1-102(A) (3) (1984) (repealed 1987).
53. 213 Md. 243, 131 A.2d 729 (1957).
54. Id. at 247, 131 A.2d at 731-32.
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the meters"55 and, therefore,justified a severe sanction.56 Also, in Ma-
ryland State Bar Ass'n v. Agnew,5" the court determined that an attor-
ney's willful attempt to evade federal income taxes was conduct
involving moral turpitude,58 and that such conduct should result in
disbarment unless accompanied by compelling extenuating
circumstances. 9
Since January 1, 1987, Maryland Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4
has been the guideline for sanctioning misconduct that reflects ad-
versely on an attorney's fitness to practice law.6° Unlike the MCPR,
the MRPC does not include the language "moral turpitude" when
specifying what is professional misconduct for a lawyer. 6 The drafters
of Rule 8.4 broadened the professional misconduct standard to "con-
duct prejudicial to the administration of justice."62 In Attorney Griev-
ance Commission v. Bereano,63 the court stated that, under the MRPC,
an attorney's misconduct is subject to disciplinary sanctions "irrespec-
tive of whether the crime is also one of moral turpitude."64 Thus,
while the realm of sanctionable misconduct has increased under Rule
8.4 by virtue of the broadened standard, the court no longer generally
analyzes the egregiousness of an attorney's misconduct.6 5
The Court of Appeals of Maryland also considers the relationship
of the attorney's misconduct to the practice of law when determining
55. Id., 131 A.2d at 731.
56. Id., 131 A.2d at 732.
57. 271 Md. 543, 318 A.2d 811 (1974).
58. Id. at 551, 318 A.2d at 815.
59. See id. at 550-51, 318 A.2d at 815. The court stated: "In the absence of a compelling
exculpatory explanation, we think that the answer to [the question of whether it is proper
for the attorney to continue as a member of the legal profession] must be no when an
attorney is found guilty of a crime which is deemed to involve moral turpitude." Id. at 550,
318 A.2d at 815; see also Md. State Bar Ass'n v. Hirsch, 274 Md. 368, 377, 335 A.2d 108, 113,
cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1012 (1975) (explaining that the court has "repeatedly held that con-
duct involving moral turpitude will result in disbarment in the absence of compelling cir-
cumstances justifying a lesser sanction").
60. The Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct, 13 Md. Reg. 3 (May 23, 1986).
61. Mo. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4 (2002).
62. MD. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(d).
63. 357 Md. 321, 744 A.2d 35 (2000).
64. Id. at 335, 744 A.2d at 42 (quoting Att'y Griev. Comm'n v. Casalino, 335 Md. 446,
451, 644 A.2d 43, 45 (1994)). In Casalino, the court stated that "[t]he fact that 'crime of
moral turpitude' was removed as a factor in disciplinary proceedings does not mean that
there now is no such thing as a crime of moral turpitude." Casalino, 335 Md. at 451, 644
A.2d at 45.
65. See Att'y Griev. Comm'n v. Hollis, 347 Md. 547, 560, 702 A.2d 223, 230 (1997)
(disbarring an attorney for misappropriation after finding simply that he acted "knowingly
and intentionally"). But see Att'y Griev. Comm'n v. Protokowicz, 329 Md. 252, 263, 619
A.2d 100, 105 (1993) (noting that "the egregious nature of [the attorney's] conduct war-
rants the imposition of a significant sanction").
488 [VOL. 61:482
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an appropriate sanction.66 In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Gilbert,
the court implied that misconduct closely related to the attorney's law
practice deserves a harsher sanction.67 The Gilbert court, by imposing
only a thirty-day suspension for an attorney convicted for possession of
crack cocaine, placed added weight on the fact that the misconduct
was private and "not directly related to the practice of law."68
However, in cases where an attorney has misappropriated funds
or engaged in similar fraudulent activity, the court does not make a
distinction between misconduct occurring outside the attorney's pro-
fessional capacity and misconduct occurring in a professional set-
ting.69 In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Silk,7" the court disbarred an
attorney who misappropriated funds while serving as the Treasurer
and President of a high school Father's Club.71 The court explained
that "there appears to be no sound reason for regarding misappropri-
ations committed in a non-professional capacity more leniently than
those committed in a professional capacity."72 In abandoning the dis-
tinction between misconduct occurring outside the scope of the prac-
tice of law and misconduct in the professional setting, the court noted
that the misappropriation of funds, both in a professional and non-
professional context, "bear[s] equally on the fitness of a lawyer to
practice his profession."73
The court also considers whether any factors mitigate a possible
sanction. 4 In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Gilbert, the court consid-
ered several mitigating factors in imposing a thirty-day suspension on
an attorney convicted of cocaine possession.75 The court specifically
relied on the fact that the attorney had never been subject to a disci-
plinary proceeding, the attorney's misconduct was not directly related
66. Att'y Griev. Comm'n v. Gilbert, 356 Md. 249, 255, 739 A.2d 1, 4 (1999) (stating "[i]t
is also an important consideration whether the [misconduct] is directly connected to the
attorney's practice of law").
67. See id. at 253, 739 A.2d at 3 (noting that "to the extent that conduct of a lawyer
adversely affects that lawyer's fitness to practice law, it necessarily prejudices the adminis-
tration of justice").
68. Id. at 256, 739 A.2d at 5.
69. See Casalino, 335 Md. at 452, 644 A.2d at 46.
70. 279 Md. 345, 369 A.2d 70 (1977).
71. Id. at 349, 369 A.2d at 72.
72. Id. at 348, 369 A.2d at 71.
73. Id.; see also Casalino, 335 Md. at 452, 644 A.2d at 46 ("Cheating one's client and
defrauding the government are reprehensible in equal degree.").
74. See Att'y Griev. Comm'n v. Gilbert, 356 Md. 249, 256, 739 A.2d 1, 5 (1999) (indicat-
ing that "rehabilitative efforts by an attorney may mitigate" a sanction).
75. Id.
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to the practice of law, and the attorney had made efforts to rehabili-
tate himself1
6
However, the court's approach in considering various mitigating
factors has been inconsistent. In Attorney Grievance Commission v.
White,77 the court placed little weight on such factors. In White, the
court disbarred an attorney who misappropriated funds from a client
despite the fact that the attorney subsequently replaced the money,
and that the attorney was an alcoholic at the time of the misappropria-
tion.7" In determining an appropriate sanction, the Court of Appeals
stated that misappropriation of funds by an attorney "is an act in-
fected with deceit and dishonesty and ordinarily will result in disbar-
ment in the absence of compelling extenuating circumstances justifying
a lesser sanction."79 Thus, in misappropriation cases, a typical mitigat-
ing factor such as an attorney's substance abuse must be shown to be
the cause of the misconduct "to a substantial extent" in order to lessen
the severity of a sanction.80
Two other cases highlight the inconsistent attention the court has
given to mitigating factors when administering a sanction. In Attorney
Grievance Commission v. Greenspan,s" the court allowed the emotional
stress an attorney suffered after the death of his father and illness of
his mother to mitigate the severity of a sanction, despite upholding
the hearing judge's conclusion that the attorney had willfully misrep-
resented facts in his dealings with a savings and loan association.8 2 In
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Protokowicz,"3 however, the court re-
fused to allow the hearing judge's findings that an attorney's miscon-
duct84 resulted from his intoxication, his emotional involvement in
the case, and his "otherwise unstable psychological state at the time"
to mitigate the attorney's indefinite suspension.85
76. Id.
77. 328 Md. 412, 614 A.2d 955 (1992).
78. Id. at 415, 421, 614 A.2d at 957, 960.
79. Id. at 417, 614 A.2d at 958 (emphasis added) (quoting Att'y Griev. Comm'n v.
Ezrin, 312 Md. 603, 608-09, 541 A.2d 966, 969 (1988)).
80. Id. at 418, 614 A.2d at 958 (quoting Att'y Griev. Comm'n v. Miller, 301 Md. 592,
608, 483 A.2d 1281, 1290 (1984)).
81. 313 Md. 180, 545 A.2d 12 (1988).
82. Id. at 188, 545 A.2d at 16-17.
83. 329 Md. 252, 619 A.2d 100 (1993).
84. The hearing judge found that Protokowicz entered the home of his client's ex-wife
without her knowledge or permission, stole personal property from the house, and killed
the family cat in a microwave. Id. at 256, 619 A.2d at 102.
85. Id. at 262-63, 619 A.2d at 104-05. The court noted that "[a]lthough [the attorney's]
conduct.., was an aberration, the egregious nature of that conduct warrants the imposi-
tion of a significant sanction." Id. at 263, 619 A.2d at 105.
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B. The Court of Appeals of Matyland's Approach to Sanctions in Sexual
Misconduct Cases
The Court of Appeals has had only two opportunities to apply
MRPC 8.4 to attorney disciplinary proceedings involving sexual mis-
conduct, and only one of these cases specifically involved sexual mis-
conduct with children. 6 These cases, similar to other attorney
disciplinary proceedings considered by the court, highlight the court's
increasing emphasis on the mitigating factors of a particular case.8 7
In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Mitchell, the Court of Appeals
agreed with the recommendation of Bar Counsel to indefinitely sus-
pend from the practice of law an attorney convicted of performing
sexual acts upon a thirteen-year-old boy on several occasions.88 The
Bar Counsel's recommendation for an indefinite suspension rested on
the determination that the crime involved moral turpitude,89 and that
no mitigating factors were present.9" The Court of Appeals agreed
with the recommendation of Bar Counsel without providing further
explanation.9' In his dissent, Judge Cole argued that indefinite sus-
pension had been the appropriate sanction in cases only when the
misconduct had been "caused" by mental illness.92 Because the crime
involved moral turpitude, Judge Cole believed disbarment was the ap-
propriate sanction.9"
In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Goldsborough,94 the court relied
heavily on mitigating factors. The court explained that it must con-
sider the causes of an attorney's misconduct and the "prospects for
rehabilitation" when determining the appropriate sanction for an at-
86. See Att'y Griev. Comm'n v. Mitchell, 308 Md. 653, 654-55, 521 A.2d 746, 747-48
(1987) (imposing an indefinite suspension on an attorney convicted of performing sexual
acts on a thirteen-year-old boy); see also Att'y Griev. Comm'n v. Goldsborough, 330 Md.
342, 366, 624 A.2d 503, 514 (1993) (imposing an indefinite suspension on an attorney
engaging in sexual misconduct with his secretary and two female clients).
87. See Goldsborough, 330 Md. at 365, 624 A.2d at 514 (indicating that the court must
consider the "underlying causes of an attorney's misconduct and the prospects for
rehabilitation").
88. 308 Md. 653, 655, 521 A.2d 746, 748 (1987).
89. Under the Maryland Code of Professional Responsibility, a crime involving moral
turpitude constituted a violation of the disciplinary rules. MD. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSI-
BILITY DR 1-102(A)(3) (1984) (repealed 1987).
90. Mitchell, 308 Md. at 655, 521 A.2d at 747-48.
91. Id., 521 A.2d at 748.
92. Id. at 657, 521 A.2d at 748 (Cole, J., dissenting). Judge Cole explained that the
court imposes an indefinite suspension in cases where the misconduct has been caused by
mental illness because if the illness can be treated, the attorney may be fit to practice law in
the future. Id. at 656, 521 A.2d at 748.
93. Id. at 658, 521 A.2d at 749.
94. 330 Md. 342, 624 A.2d 503 (1993).
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torney who violated MRPC 8.4(a) and 8.4(d) by engaging in sexual
misconduct with his secretary and two female clients.95 The court also
considered the attorney's refusal to acknowledge the wrongfulness of
his conduct and his refusal to admit to any kind of behavioral prob-
lem.96 Finally, the court noted the attorney's professional accomplish-
ments and demonstrated legal ability, essentially balancing the harm
caused by the attorney's conduct against the benefit of allowing a
competent attorney to continue to practice law.97 After considering
these factors, the Goldsborough court ultimately rejected Bar Counsel's
recommended sanction of disbarment and suspended the attorney in-
definitely with a right to reapply two years from the date of the opin-
ion.98 In dissent, Judge Bell argued that the attorney's refusal to
admit to his misconduct should have prevented the majority from im-
posing a sanction designed to encourage the attorney to seek help for
his disorder.99 Judge Bell believed that the attorney's refusal to admit
a problem aggravated, rather than mitigated, his misconduct and justi-
fied disbarment."' 0
C. Other Jurisdictions' Approach to Sanctions in Sexual Misconduct Cases
Other jurisdictions follow an approach similar to that of the
Court of Appeals of Maryland in determining appropriate sanctions in
attorney disciplinary proceedings involving sexual misconduct, 10 1 par-
ticularly cases involving sexual misconduct with children. These juris-
dictions focus more on the mitigating circumstances than on the
nature of the misconduct or the relationship of the misconduct to the
95. Id. at 365-66, 624 A.2d at 514. The attorney had on several occasions spanked his
secretary and a client and on one occasion had kissed a client on the cheek without her
consent. Id. at 348-51, 624 A.2d at 505-07.
96. Id. at 363, 624 A.2d at 513.
97. See id. at 363, 624 A.2d at 513 (listing the attorney's professional accomplishments
and weighing them against the "emotional, psychological, and social" harm caused by the
attorney's conduct).
98. Id. at 366, 624 A.2d at 514.
99. Id. at 374, 624 A.2d at 518-19 (Bell, J., dissenting) (stating that "because the [attor-
ney] does not admit the conduct, I am puzzled as to how [he] can aggressively seek help
when he has indicated, emphatically, that he not only does not need help, but that he did
not commit the acts alleged").
100. Id. at 375, 624 A.2d at 519. Judge Bell predicated this conclusion on determining
that the hearing judge's conclusion that the attorney provided false testimony was not
clearly erroneous. Id.
101. In other jurisdictions, this type of misconduct is governed by Rule 8.4 or its
equivalent. See, e.g., In re Conn, 715 N.E.2d 379, 381 (Ind. 1999) (finding an attorney's
criminal conviction for conveying and receiving child pornography to be a violation of
Professional Conduct Rule 8.4(b)).
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practice of law.' ° 2 In In re Safran,1 ° 3 the Supreme Court of California
suspended an attorney for three years after the attorney was convicted
of two counts of annoying or molesting a child under the age of eigh-
teen, but subsequently suspended the order and placed the attorney
on probation. 10 4 The court reduced its sanction because the attorney
was in a psychiatric treatment program, the attorney's doctor testified
to a remote possibility of repeated conduct, and the attorney ex-
pressed remorse for his acts.105 Similarly, in Iowa Board of Professional
Ethics v. Blazek, the court imposed a two-year suspension on an attor-
ney who had engaged in improper sexual conduct with his eleven-
year-old nephew rather than the three-year suspension recommended
by the grievance commission. 1°6 The court imposed the lighter sanc-
tion, in part, because the attorney accepted responsibility for his ac-
tions, sought counseling, and had taken measures to ensure that his
misconduct would not be repeated.10 7 Finally, in In re Conn, °8 the
Supreme Court of Indiana sanctioned an attorney for not disclosing a
federal investigation into his child pornography activities to the state's
Board of Law Examiners. 0 9 The court cited mitigating factors, such
as admitting the misconduct and voluntarily seeking psychiatric treat-
ment, as justification for a relatively mild sanction.10
III. THE COURT'S REASONING
In a case of first impression in Maryland, the Court of Appeals
suspended James F. Childress, a practicing attorney in Maryland and
the District of Columbia, indefinitely from the practice of law with a
102. See, e.g., Iowa Bd. of Prof'l Ethics v. Blazek, 590 N.W.2d 501, 504 (Iowa 1999) (dis-
cussing several mitigating circumstances that would lessen the severity of a sanction for an
attorney who sexually assaulted his eleven-year-old nephew).
103. 554 P.2d 329 (Cal. 1976).
104. Id. at 330.
105. Id. at 329-30. The court also relied on testimony from the chief trial attorney at the
firm where the misbehaving attorney practiced. The chief trial attorney stated that "the
petitioner's performance as a lawyer was of the highest professional caliber," and that he
would be allowed to continue to practice at the firm. Id. at 330.
106. Blazek, 590 N.W.2d at 504.
107. Id. In Blazek, the court also relied on the fact that the attorney's ability to practice
had not been questioned, and that the misconduct had not adversely affected his clients.
Id. at 503.
108. 715 N.E.2d 379 (Ind. 1999).
109. Id. at 381.
110. Id. at 382. The court, however, rejected the attorney's argument that his ignorance
as to the criminal nature of his conduct should serve as a mitigating factor, stating that
"respondent either knew, or reasonably should have known," that his conduct was illegal.
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right to terminate the suspension after one year.'11 The suspension
followed the court's decision to uphold the conclusion of the hearing
judge that Childress's solicitation of sex from minor females using the
Internet and subsequent in-person meetings violated MRPC 8.4(d)." 2
Judge Rodowsky, writing for the majority,113 first addressed Chil-
dress's exceptions to the hearing judge's findings that he violated sec-
tion 3-831 (a) of the Maryland Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article,
which states that "[i]t is unlawful for an adult wilfully to contribute to,
encourage, cause or tend to cause any act, omission, or condition
which results in a violation, renders a child delinquent, in need of
supervision, or in need of assistance.""' The court held that despite
the fact that Childress encouraged young girls to meet with him and
had, in fact, met with the girls, there was no clear and convincing
evidence" 5 to establish that Childress had rendered the girls in need
of "guidance, treatment, or rehabilitation."' 16
The court then addressed Childress's exception to the hearing
judge's finding that Childress violated Virginia Code section 18.2-
370(4), which prohibits persons eighteen years of age or older from
knowingly and intentionally proposing an act of sexual intercourse to
any child under the age of fourteen. 1 17 Childress argued that he
could not have violated the statute because he did not know with cer-
tainty that the girls were under the age of fourteen, and that he did
not "propose" sexual intercourse as the word is used in the statute.18
The court rejected Childress's arguments and held that he did violate
the Virginia statute. 119 As a result, the court overruled Childress's ex-
111. Childress II, 364 Md. at 67, 770 A.2d at 696.
112. Id. at 64, 770 A.2d at 694.
113. Chief Judge Bell,Judge Wilner, andJudge Harrell joined in the majority opinion.
Id. at 51, 770 A.2d at 687.
114. See id. at 53-54, 770 A.2d at 688-89; see also MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JuD. PROC. § 3-
831 (1998). Section 3-801 (f) of the Courts andJudicial Proceedings Article further defines
a child "in need of supervision" as one "who requires guidance, treatment, or rehabilita-
tion." Id. § 3-801.
115. See Childress 1I, 364 Md. at 55, 770 A.2d at 689 (stating that in an attorney discipli-
nary proceeding, Bar Counsel seeking to have a sanction imposed has the burden of prov-
ing that a Maryland Rule of Professional Conduct has been violated by clear and
convincing evidence). The court further noted that the standard is maintained regardless
of whether the attorney's conduct has resulted in a criminal conviction. Id.
116. Id. at 56, 770 A.2d at 690.
117. Id. at 57, 770 A-2d at 691; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-370(A)(4) (Michie Supp.
2001).
118. Childress II, 364 Md. at 58, 770 A.2d at 691.
119. Id. at 64, 770 A.2d at 694.
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ception that he violated MRPC 8.4(d) and determined that a sanction
was warranted.
120
In determining the appropriate sanction, the court first ad-
dressed the nature of Childress's misconduct in light of the overall
goals of protecting the public and deterring the errant attorney.'
2 1
The court recognized that Childress's conduct had "seriously under-
mined public confidence in the legal profession" and concluded that
a sanction more severe than Childress's recommendation of a repri-
mand was necessary. 12 2 In addition to the harm caused, the court
considered factors that could mitigate a possible sanction.123 In par-
ticular, the court noted that Childress had been a member of the bar
for more than ten years without prior incident when the offenses oc-
curred, had acknowledged the inappropriateness of his conduct, had
expressed remorse, and had undergone extensive counseling since his
arrest in 1995.124 In considering Childress's psychiatric treatment, the
court relied heavily on the testimony of Doctor Susan Feister.' 25 Dr.
Feister testified at both Childress's criminal proceeding and the evi-
dentiary hearings that Childress's treatment had been a "rousing suc-
cess." 1 26 She further noted that Childress still had "a few anxieties,"
but there was "an insignificant risk" that Childress would engage in
similar behavior again.
127
The court then examined one Maryland case and several out-of-
state cases involving sexual misconduct with children to seek guidance
on the issue of an appropriate sanction. 128 The court listed the facts
of several cases in which attorneys were convicted of sexual miscon-
duct with children and the resulting sanctions imposed by the respec-
tive courts; 129 however, the court failed to discuss the reasoning
120. Id.
121. See id., 770 A.2d at 695 (explaining that the purpose of attorney disciplinary pro-
ceedings is to protect the public, and that concepts of general and specific deterrence are
consistent with this goal).
122. Id. at 65, 770 A.2d at 695. The court specifically noted that a more severe sanction
was necessary "to deter similar future conduct" by Childress and "to serve notice on the
members of the Bar ... that this type of conduct ... will not be tolerated." Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See id. at 65-66, 770 A.2d at 695-96.
126. Id. at 65, 770 A.2d at 696.
127. Id. at 66, 770 A.2d at 696.
128. Id. at 66-67, 770 A.2d at 696.
129. Id. The court relied on Attorney Grievance Commission v. Mitchell, 308 Md. 653, 655,
521 A.2d 746, 747-48 (1987) (finding that an indefinite suspension was the appropriate
sanction for an attorney who had been convicted of a second degree sexual offense for
performing sexual acts on a thirteen-year-old boy); In re Saftan, 554 P.2d 329, 329-30 (Cal.
1976) (suspending an attorney for a three-year period and placing him under supervision
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behind the decisions in the cases it listed. 3 ° The court distinguished
Childress's case, stating that "[u]nlike the cited cases, Childress did
not sexually touch the victims involved in this case." '13 1 The court
then followed the recommendation of Bar Counsel and suspended
Childress indefinitely without a right to apply for termination of the
suspension until one year from the effective date of the suspension.1 32
Judge Cathell, joined by Judge Raker, filed a dissenting and con-
curring opinion.' 3 Judge Cathell agreed with the majority that Chil-
dress's conduct violated Virginia Code section 18.2-370(A) (4), and
thus violated MRPC 8.4(d)."34 However, Judge Cathell strongly dis-
agreed with the majority's ruling that Childress's conduct did not vio-
late Maryland Courts and Judicial Proceedings section 3-831. He
wrote that a child younger than fifteen who engages in sexually re-
lated Internet conversation with older men and eventually meets with
those men is "in need of guidance."'3 5 Judge Cathell also disagreed
with the sanction imposed by the court and with the court's determi-
nation that "an adult sexual predator" is "fit to practice law and has
not engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of jus-
tice." 136 He compared the facts of the case with a line of cases in
which the court continuously disbarred attorneys for misappropria-
tion of funds.1 3 7 In his view, enticing young females away from their
homes for sexual purposes was "far more serious" than stealing
after his conviction for molesting a child under the age of eighteen); In re Conn, 715
N.E.2d 379, 382 (Ind. 1999) (giving an attorney a minimum of a two-year suspension after
his conviction for sexual exploitation of minors); In re Wells, 572 N.E.2d 1290, 1293 (Ind.
1991) (suspending an attorney for three years for conduct that included touching male
high school students between the ages of sixteen and eighteen, displaying videotapes de-
picting sex acts to them, and conversing with them about sexual matters); Iowa Bd. of Profl
Ethics v. Blazek, 590 N.W.2d 501, 504 (Iowa 1999) (suspending indefinitely an attorney for
sexually assaulting his eleven-year-old nephew); In re Herman, 527 A.2d 868, 871 (N.J. 1987)
(suspending an attorney for three years for sexually assaulting a ten-year-old boy); In re
Wong, 710 N.Y.S.2d 57, 61 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) (finding public censure an appropriate
reprimand for an attorney who admitted to sexually touching a ten-year-old female); and
Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. King, 523 N.E.2d 857, 860 (Ohio 1988) (imposing a one-year
suspension for an attorney engaging in sexual relations with a fifteen-year-old girl).
130. See Childress II, 364 Md. at 66-67, 770 A.2d at 696.
131. Id. at 67, 770 A.2d at 696.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 67 (Cathell, J., dissenting and concurring).
134. Id. at 67-68, 770 A.2d at 697.
135. Id. at 68, 770 A.2d at 697. Judge Cathell stated that he "simply [could not] compre-
hend how any person [could] conclude otherwise." Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 68-69, 770 A.2d at 697-98.
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money; therefore, he felt Childress should be disbarred. 3 Judge
Cathell also dismissed the majority's notion that somehow a lesser
sanction was warranted because Childress had not actually engaged in
sexual conduct with any of the girls.' 39 Judge Cathell reasoned that
the evidence was clear as to Childress's intention to engage in sexual
conduct, and that Childress remained a sexual predator. As a result,
"the mere fact that he made no 'kill' should not be considered as a
mitigating factor."'14
IV. ANALYSIS
In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Childress, the Court of Appeals
of Maryland should have disbarred Childress from the practice of law.
This would have been the only way to accomplish the court's stated
goal of protecting the public and preserving public confidence in the
legal system.' In opting for an indefinite suspension with a right to
terminate the suspension after only one year, the court failed to ade-
quately address the egregiousness of Childress's conduct. Instead, the
Court focused too much on the factual differences between this case
and prior cases involving sexual misconduct and gave too much
weight to mitigating factors. The court's sanction suggests that Rule
8.4 does not necessarily prohibit the misconduct of attorneys that has
the potential to undermine confidence in the profession if that mis-
conduct is not related to the practice of law. Furthermore, although
the court recognized the inherent danger in adults preying on chil-
dren via the Internet, it failed, via its inadequate sanction, to resolve
what it determined to be a "grave social problem,"' 42 thereby under-
mining public trust in the legal community.
138. Id. at 69, 770 A.2d at 699 ("Steal money, you are disbarred. Steal a quarter's worth
of parking time and you are disbarred. Forever steal a child's innocence and you're sus-
pended. In my view, the Court has a serious problem with its priorities.").
139. Id. at 74, 770 A.2d at 700.
140. Id. at 74 n.4, 770 A.2d at 701 n.4. Judge Cathell further illustrated this point by
noting that "[ e ]ven a lion, I am told, misses in four out of five hunts. Nonetheless, the lion
remains a lion." Id.
141. Childress II, 364 Md. at 64, 770 A.2d at 695 (stating that "[tihe purpose of discipli-
nary proceedings is to protect the public and preserve public confidence in the legal sys-
tem"); see also Stephen G. Benh, Note, Why Not Fine Attorneys?: An Economic Approach to
Lawyer Disciplinary Sanctions, 43 STAN. L. REv. 907, 912 (1991) ("Modern attorney discipline
cases mechanically recite the following goals and purposes for attorney discipline proceed-
ings: 1. To protect the public . . . 3. To preserve public confidence in the legal
profession.").
142. Childress II, 364 Md. at 65, 770 A.2d at 695.
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A. The Court's Focus on Distinguishing Facts Failed to Address the Effect
of the Misconduct on Public Perception of the Legal Profession
The court focused on the factual differences between Childress's
case and other cases involving sexual misconduct by lawyers rather
than the generally egregious nature of sexual misconduct and its po-
tential to undermine public confidence in the legal profession."' If
the court adhered to its goal of preserving public trust in the legal
profession, it would have analyzed the egregiousness of Childress's
conduct. Instead, the court chose to limit its analysis to how Chil-
dress's misconduct varied from prior cases of attorney misconduct,
144
thus avoiding a discussion of the dangerous and immoral nature of
Childress's misconduct. In so doing, the court failed to maintain an
adequate connection between its analysis of the misconduct and its
stated goal of preserving public confidence in the legal profession.
In its reasoning, the court inadequately attempted to justify a
more lenient sanction in the present case because, unlike prior cases
involving sexual misconduct, Childress "did not sexually touch the vic-
tims."145 The court's focus on this specific distinguishing characteris-
tic seems misplaced in light of the court's prior determination that
preying on children over the Internet is a "grave social problem. 14 6
Reasoning that Childress's misconduct was egregious, but could have
been worse, served to avoid addressing the nature of Childress's
harm-a harm that the court realized existed when it deemed Chil-
dress's act part of a social disorder. Judge Cathell explicitly addressed
the nature of Childress's action in his dissent. In his view, the fact that
Childress did not sexually touch his victims did not detract from the
egregiousness of his using the Internet to prey on young girls: "The
hunting itself sufficiently warrant[ed] the sanction of
disbarment."' 4 7
The gravity of the harm caused by Childress's misconduct war-
ranted a more extensive analysis-one based on prior cases involving
the highest concern for public confidence in the legal profession. For
example, the court has recognized the effect on public confidence in
the legal profession when attorneys have misappropriated client funds
and willfully evaded paying income taxes.141 In Attorney Grievance Com-
143. Id. at 66-67, 770 A.2d at 696.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 67, 770 A.2d at 696.
146. Id. at 65, 770 A.2d at 695.
147. Id. at 74, 770 A.2d at 700 (Cathell, J., dissenting and concurring).
148. See, e.g., Att'y Griev. Comm'n v. Williams, 335 Md. 458, 474, 644 A.2d 490, 497
(1994) (emphasizing the egregious nature of misappropriating client funds); see also Md.
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mission v. Williams, the court disbarred an attorney for the misappro-
priation of client funds even though the attorney's misconduct
stemmed from his cocaine addiction. 4 9 The court focused on the
nature of the harm as being "an act infected with deceit and dishon-
esty" and, therefore, refused to let anything short of compelling exten-
uating circumstances justify a lesser sanction.15 ° Similarly, in State Bar
Ass'n v. Agnew, the court disbarred an attorney for willful tax evasion
because, although the misconduct was not directly related to the prac-
tice of law, it was a "willful and serious malefaction" that brought "dis-
honor to both the bar and the democratic institutions of our
nation.""' a Furthermore, in Fellner v. Bar Ass'n of Baltimore City,'52 the
court recognized the importance of public confidence in the legal
profession when it concluded that an attorney who placed slugs in
parking meters-misappropriating a miniscule amount of money-
deserved to be disbarred.' 53 The court realized it had a duty to pro-
tect the public confidence in the legal profession from even the slight-
est assault on the public's financial well-being. 5 4
Childress's conduct in the present case was a serious assault on
the public's confidence in the legal profession.1 55 The majority even
explicitly recognized this fact.1 56 In order to protect public confi-
dence the court should have analyzed the present case like others in
which the court found that attorney misconduct seriously under-
mined public confidence in the profession. Had it done so, the court
would have concluded that disbarment was the appropriate sanction.
B. The Court Placed Inordinate Weight on Mitigating Factors
The court again erred when it shifted its analysis from the nature
of the harm caused by Childress's misconduct and focused extensively
on mitigating factors.157 In so doing, the court furthered the inher-
ently arbitrary process of according weight to these factors, thereby
further weakening public confidence in the legal profession and sys-
State Bar Ass'n v. Agnew, 271 Md. 543, 550-51, 318 A.2d 811, 815 (1974) (describing the
effect lawyer misconduct has on the public perception of the profession).
149. Williams, 335 Md. at 474, 644 A.2d at 497-98.
150. Id., 644 A.2d at 497.
151. Agnew, 271 Md. at 550-51, 318 A.2d at 815.
152. 213 Md. 243, 131 A.2d 729 (1957).
153. Id. at 247, 131 A.2d at 732.
154. See id., 131 A.2d at 731.
155. Childress II, 364 Md. at 65, 770 A.2d at 695 (noting that "Childress's misconduct
seriously undermined public confidence in the legal profession" (emphasis added)).
156. Id.
157. Id. at 65-66, 770 A.2d at 695-96.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
tem.'15  Balancing mitigating factors is inherently arbitrary because
the extent to which the court considers them is particular to the facts
of each case 15' and within the discretion of the court. 60 The court's
added focus on the particular mitigating factors in Childress II high-
lights the lack of consistency that results from an approach which al-
lows for the individual mitigating circumstances of a particular case to
be considered. t6 '
In Childress II, the court failed to disbar Childress after consider-
ing that he was a ten-year member of the Bar, that he acknowledged
the inappropriateness of his conduct, and that he expressed re-
morse.'6 2 One result of the court's heightened consideration of these
factors has the potential to increase the misapplication of these fac-
tors. 13 Attorneys facing a disciplinary proceeding, for example, may
158. See Leslie C. Levin, The Emperor's Clothes and Other Tales About the Standardsfor Impos-
ing Lawyer Discipline Sanctions, 48 AM. U. L. REv. 1, 49 (1998). In her article, Professor
Levin thoroughly examines many of the current problems with the way sanctions are im-
posed in attorney disciplinary cases. She points out that the lack of well-defined standards
followed by courts in imposing sanctions raises serious questions about the fairness, consis-
tency, and overall effectiveness of the sanctions imposed. Id. at 5-6. In particular, Profes-
sor Levin argues that various aggravating and mitigating factors are "reflexively-and
inconsistently-invoked by the courts, even though some of the factors would appear to
deserve little, if any, consideration." Id. at 49. The logical next step in her reasoning is
that the inconsistency generated by a haphazard application of mitigating factors fails to
accomplish the goal of protecting public confidence in the legal profession.
159. Compare Att'y Griev. Comm'n v. Protokowicz, 329 Md. 252, 262-63, 619 A.2d 100,
104-05 (1993) (suspending an attorney indefinitely with the right to apply for reinstate-
ment after one year after consideration of the offending attorney's voluntary alcohol abuse
treatment and his being a "competent, ethical, and respected attorney, and a caring mem-
ber of his community"), with Att'y Griev. Comm'n v. White, 328 Md. 412, 421, 614 A.2d
955, 960 (1992) (disbarring an attorney for misappropriating client funds despite the attor-
ney's claim that alcoholism had caused his behavior).
160. See Att'y Griev. Comm'n v. Bereano, 357 Md. 321, 329 n.7, 744 A.2d 35, 40 n.7
(2000) (recognizing that the beneficial acts of an attorney and the minor degree of the
harm caused, "may be considered by the Court of Appeals in establishing [an] appropriate
sanction").
161. See Levin, supra note 158, at 66 (stating that "routine and unrestrained" considera-
tion of mitigating factors "presents increased opportunities for bias and unwarranted in-
consistency to creep into the decision-making process").
162. Childress II, 364 Md. at 65, 770 A.2d at 695.
163. See Levin, supra note 158, at 50-58 (discussing some of the problems that result
from the added focus and misapplication of mitigating factors such as an attorney's experi-
ence in the practice of law, the absence of a prior disciplinary record, and an attorney's
character and reputation). In addressing the issue of whether an attorney's character and
reputation should be allowed to mitigate a particular sanction, Professor Levin points out
that a good reputation could help to predict the attorney's future conduct or it could
simply be the result of the "bad facts" about the attorney being difficult to detect. Id. at 55.
Although the court in Childress II did not expressly rely on Childress's character as a miti-
gating factor, the court did rely on the fact that Childress is now married and engaged in a
normal and healthy sexual relationship. Childress II, 364 Md. at 66, 770 A.2d at 696. How-
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simply admit to their misconduct and apologize in order to create mit-
igating factors to which the attorney can point to avoid disbarment.
This creates the possibility that attorneys will not truly acknowledge
the wrongfulness of their misconduct. The court in Childress II, in giv-
ing consideration to Childress's remorse and acknowledgement of his
misconduct, implicitly decided that Childress's numerous attempts to
avoid a criminal conviction and disciplinary sanction on the basis of
technicalities' 64 did not offset his acknowledgement of misconduct. 165
In future cases where attorneys express remorse, the ability of the
court to determine when a mitigating factor deserves consideration
becomes more problematic and necessarily more inconsistent because
the court will have to determine when an attorney is truly expressing
remorse and when he or she is simply attempting to avoid a harsh
sanction."' Ultimately, the court's consideration of mitigating factors
becomes further detached from the consideration of the egregious-
ness of the attorney's misconduct. As a result, the public's confidence
in attorneys adhering to a higher standard of moral conduct is under-
mined because the public will be unsure whether attorneys are being
adequately sanctioned for their misconduct or are avoiding a harsh
sanction by offering empty expressions of remorse.'67
The court's focus on these mitigating factors creates an addi-
tional problem in determining an appropriate sanction because it
necessarily shifts the focus from the effect of the egregious conduct
on public confidence to the benefits the public receives from having a
ever, the same dangers that Levin highlights are present. The fact that Childress is now in
a healthy relationship could be a prediction of future behavior or it simply could be that
the "bad facts" about whether he will revert to past behavior are undetectable.
164. See Childress II, 364 Md. at 57-58, 770 A.2d at 691 (discussing Childress's challenge
to Judge Johnson's finding that he violated Virginia Code § 18.2-370(A) (4) on the basis
that he did not "know" the girl was thirteen and did not "propose" an act of sexual inter-
course as the term is construed by Virginia courts).
165. See id. at 65, 770 A.2d at 695 (describing the various mitigating factors considered
by the court).
166. See Levin, supra note 158, at 49 (discussing how the courts' application of mitigat-
ing factors has allowed bias and inconsistency to become part of the decision-making
process).
167. See State Bar Ass'n v. Agnew, 271 Md. 543, 549, 318 A.2d 811, 814 (1974) ("[T]he
presence of [truth, candor, and honesty] in members of the bar comprises a large portion
of the fulcrum upon which the scales of'justice rest. Consequently, an attorney's character
must remain beyond reproach."); see also Levin, supra note 158, at 5-6 (suggesting that the
lack of well defined standards raises "serious questions about how well the sanctions im-
posed on lawyers achieve the basic goals of lawyer discipline: protection of the public,
protection of the administration of justice and preservation of confidence in the legal
profession").
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competent attorney returned to the practice of law.' 68 The net result
is that the goal of protecting the public from attorneys engaging in
serious misconduct and preserving confidence in the legal profession
becomes a secondary concern. 69 The Childress II court allowed this
result to occur by focusing on the underlying causes of Childress's
misconduct and allowing such factors to mitigate a sanction.17 0 In
Goldsborough, the court, after relying on similar mitigating factors to
impose a two-year suspension, explicitly emphasized that it is "not un-
mindful of the benefits of returning a rehabilitated attorney to the
practice of law.1 71 The court must be especially cautious, when at-
tempting to return an attorney to the practice of law, that the poten-
tial benefit to the public of having a skilled attorney practice law does
not become a greater concern than the need to protect the public
from the harm caused by the attorney's misconduct. In Childress II,
the focus on mitigating factors and Childress's fitness to practice law
distracted the court from its initial observation that Childress's mis-
conduct "seriously undermined public confidence in the legal profes-
sion" such that "a penalty more significant than a reprimand [was]
needed."' 72
The court could have more effectively framed its consideration of
mitigating factors by first analyzing the nature of the harm, and then
focusing on the extent to which these factors relate to or cause the
harm. For instance, in Attorney Grievance Commission v. Casalino, the
court related the attorney's cooperation with authorities back to the
attorney's misconduct.17 The court found that, although commenda-
ble, the attorney's "after-the-fact cooperation does not make his tax
evasion any less fraudulent, deceitful, or misrepresentative. ''174 The
nature of the harm in Childress II was the use of the Internet by an
attorney to "arrange criminal sexual liaisons" and cross state lines with
168. See Att'y Griev. Comm'n v. Goldsborough, 330 Md. 342, 366, 624 A.2d 503, 514
(1993) (stating that "in light of [the attorney's] long and otherwise exemplary professional
career, we would be doing a disservice by forever barring him from returning to the prac-
tice of law").
169. See id. (discussing the majority's hope that, in imposing a sanction of suspension
rather than disbarment, the "possibility of being reinstated will motivate him to aggres-
sively seek appropriate help"). The court further indicated that the termination of the
suspension for the attorney in Goldsborough was dependent upon "assurance that similar
incidents will not be repeated." Id.
170. See Childress II, 364 Md. at 65-66, 770 A.2d at 695-96 (describing the mitigating
factors relied upon by the court).
171. Goldsborough, 330 Md. at 365, 624 A.2d at 514.
172. Childress II, 364 Md. at 65, 770 A.2d at 695.
173. Att'y Griev. Comm'n v. Casalino, 335 Md. 446, 452, 644 A.2d 43, 46 (1994).
174. Id.
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the purpose of carrying out this criminal activity 75-an act even the
majority recognized as having a serious effect on the public's confi-
dence in the legal profession.'1 6 The court should have adopted the
approach used in cases involving the highest concern for public confi-
dence, such as cases involving misappropriation of funds, which re-
quire disbarment absent "compelling extenuating circumstances."177 In
addition, the attorney engaging in misconduct in these cases has the
burden of proving that mitigating factors have affected his behavior to
a substantial extent.1 7 8 Thus, the appropriate consideration would be
whether the treatment program and remorse expressed by Childress
in this case substantially offsets the effect of his misconduct on the
public's confidence. Framed in this manner, it is difficult to see how
Childress's treatment program and expression of remorse detracts
from the public's increasing awareness and perception that adults
preying on children via Internet use is a "grave social problem.' 79 In
fact, failing to disbar Childress as a result of these factors only in-
creases the public perception that adults engaging in such egregious
conduct will remain undeterred and unpunished.
Establishing such an analytical framework would give the court's
determination of an appropriate sanction more certainty and consis-
tency.18 0 At the same time, connecting the various mitigating factors
to the harm itself works to further the goal of protecting public confi-
dence in the legal profession because the public is assured that attor-
neys engaging in serious misconduct will not escape harsh sanctions
when the court feels an attorney has the potential to be rehabilitated.
In addition, the court's desire to return a rehabilitated attorney to the
practice of law remains intact, but is subordinated to the more impor-
tant goal of protecting the public and preserving public confidence in
the legal profession.
175. Childress II, 364 Md. at 72, 770 A.2d at 700 (Cathell,J., dissenting and concurring).
176. See supra note 122 and accompanying text (discussing the court's view of the nature
of the harm caused by Childress's misconduct).
177. Att'y Griev. Comm'n v. Bereano, 357 Md. 321, 336, 744 A.2d 35, 43 (2000) (empha-
sis added).
178. See Att'y Griev. Comm'n v. White, 328 Md. 412, 418, 614 A.2d 955, 959 (1992)
(noting that for a physical or mental malady to be a compelling extenuating circumstance,
the illness must be, to a substantial extent, responsible for the attorney's misconduct).
179. Childress II, 364 Md. at 65, 770 A.2d at 695.
180. See generally AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS
(1986) (providing an analytical framework for imposing sanctions in attorney disciplinary
proceedings in order to develop consistency among the various jurisdictions).
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
V. CONCLUSION
In Childress 1, the Court of Appeals of Maryland, after recogniz-
ing that using the Internet to sexually prey on children was a "grave
social problem" and deserving of "a penalty more significant than a
reprimand,"181 should have disbarred Childress. In opting for an in-
definite suspension with a right to apply to terminate the suspension
after only one year, the court failed to take advantage of an opportu-
nity in a case of first impression to set a tone for protecting the public
and the public's perception of the legal profession. The court limited
its use of precedent to those cases involving sexual misconduct with
children and failed to broaden its analysis to cases involving the ut-
most concern for the public and the public's perception of the legal
profession. By shifting its analysis away from the nature of the harm
caused, the court failed to maintain a connection between the harm
caused and the sanction imposed. In addition, the court focused ex-
cessively on mitigating factors, shifting its inquiry to Childress's ability
to be rehabilitated and successfully returned to the practice of law.
The court allowed the benefits of returning a rehabilitated attorney to
the practice of law to overshadow its initial determination that adults
preying on children via the Internet is a "grave social problem." '82 As
a result, the court failed to accomplish its goal of protecting the public
and preserving public confidence in the legal profession.
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181. Childress II, 364 Md. at 65, 770 A.2d at 695.
182. Id.
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